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ABSTRACT 
It is believed that there is merit in researching how the management of track maintenance is organized in the United Kingdom, 
in particular by Network Rail, and then evaluating how this can be applied to the benefit of Indonesian Railways. The purpose 
of this research was expected to provide recommendations for management improvement of track maintenance by researching 
the track maintenance management system in Network Rail. This research study is based on secondary data. The analysis was 
conducted by using comparison method which compares the British Railways management and Indonesia railway management 
related to track maintenance management. The track maintenance management system was studied by using Network Rail. The 
results were compared with track maintenance management system in Indonesia. The comparison will provide the data 
differences that evaluated so the problem can be identified. The final result of this analysis was the identification of problems 
and improvisation that can be done for the development of track maintenance management in Indonesia. Several management 
issues have been mapped to several groups: finance management, structure organization, and asset management. From the 
problems that have been mapped, some improvements are recommended as monopolist authority restriction, maintenance 
system contract extension, re-structuring organization hierarchy, business plan consideration, track monitoring strategy 
arrangement, and condition based maintenance strategy adoption.  
Keywords: Track maintenance management, asset management, British Railways, Network Rail, Indonesian railway. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The tendency of the problems caused by the high 
density of population is the availability of land and 
transportation that will affect the economic 
development of a country. The better transports give 
the better economy of the country. With the 
advantage of transporting large volumes per unit per 
square kilometer, railway is one of the main 
transportation required by the country, which have 
limited land area and high population growth. In 
addition, the other advantage of using the train is the 
level of safety which is better than driving on the 
highway. This gives a positive encouragement for the 
demand of rail transport. Based on the statistical data 
issued by BPS (Central Bureau of Statistics) 
Indonesia (BPS Indonesia, 2014), the number of 
users of the railway for passengers and freight are 
fluctuating but still have a tendency to increase from 
year to year. 
Increasing trend of train users provide challenges to 
regulators and operators to provide better services, 
especially reducing the level of train accidents. 
Although a higher level of safety than any other land 
transportation, but fatalities, loss and delay due to a 
train accident is a problem that must be minimized. 
There are two main problem issues on Indonesian 
railway. Firstly from the safety issues, most of the 
causes of the accidents due to the derailment that 
included in level preconditions for operator acts 
dominated by technological factors. The above 
research stated that the technology factor is the 
biggest problem which one of them is the poor rail 
condition. Secondly from the business issue, there are 
demand increase for railway that is pushing the 
railway system for heavily used and being subjected 
to increase its capacity. While, there are evidence that 
the track maintenance regime in Indonesia is 
inadequate and as a result it is affecting the 
performance of reliability of the train services. 
According to the problem issues above, the research 
purpose were describing and analyzing the problem 
of track maintenance management in Indonesia based 
on Network Rail track management and giving 
several improvements of track maintenance 
management. 
2 TRACK MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT 
The requirement of technical terms is a track 
function, as train guidance and the ability of 
resistance from vehicles forces through the entire 
component tracks. Further, the track should be able to 
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eliminate the risk of accidents due to track failure 
such as derailment and track collapse, also the track 
system must fulfill the requirement of the economic / 
business point of view that is represented by the 
convenience and timeliness in which the track should 
provide a convenient path for passengers and in 
accordance with the previous design speed. Based on 
the above requirements, there are several main things 
that affect performance on the tracks. There are track 
geometry, track components, track types, 
measurement of track, and track maintenance 
(Pamungkas, 2015). 
Maintenance management becomes an important 
point in the industry, especially for transportation 
industry which reached about 24% for maintenance 
cost. It is almost quarter of the total cost which 
affects significant industry profitability (Haroun & 
Duffuaa, 2009). There is not a fully structured of 
maintenance methodology that universally accepted 
because the maintenance system designed using 
experience and judgment which is supported by the 
formal decision of tools and techniques. The decision 
strategy and strategic planning in the maintenance 
system is the main thing that should be considered 
(Haroun & Duffuaa, 2009). Besides using the 
principles of an effective maintenance management 
system, most of the industry started using asset 
management system which also includes asset 
maintenance systems such as the Network Rail (NR). 
Asset management builds on data from maintenance 
management activities and provides budgets to 
maintenance management (Lewis, 2009). 
3 MANAGEMENT OF RAILWAYS IN BRITISH 
AND INDONESIA 
3.1 The British Railways (BR) 
The British Railways started with private 
management (1825–1921), then changed to 
nationalization management (1948–1980’s) and back 
again with privatization management (1992–2000’s) 
which would reduce government intervention. It 
provides the opportunity for the company to carry out 
industry with both business-oriented computation on 
Rail track and the TOCs (Train Operator 
Company/s). At the other hand, Bartle (2004) 
described the privatization of railway industry did not 
give better achievement except from the reduction of 
pollution and road congestion. The performance of 
the train, the efficiency and the safety was decrease 
with the excess rail capacity at peak hours. This 
incident then initiated changes to the management 
system. One of the management reforms is 
established NR and ORR. 
Network Rail established at 2002 as non-profit state 
company as the owner and operator of Britain's rail 
infrastructure including maintenance and inspection. 
NR is responsible for Office of Rail Regulation 
(ORR) as an independent government organization of 
rail economy and safety regulator and supervisor. NR 
enforces several main strategies to improve 
infrastructure performance which integrated with 
asset management (Network Rail, 2014). 
3.2 Indonesia Railways 
Train line maintenance based on the Ministerial 
Decree Number 52 Year 2000 which arrange the 
maintenance objective, maintenance benchmarking 
and maintenance process standard. It clarified in 
Ministerial Regulation Number 67 Year 2012 about 
Indonesia railway organization, infrastructure 
performance parameters and infrastructure 
maintenance activity. Meanwhile, the finance 
management is based on Ministerial Joint Decrees; 
there are Ministerial Decree Number 19 in 1999, 
No.S3/KMK.03/1999, and No.KEP.024/K/03/1999 
which explains in details about PSO (Public Service 
Obligation), IMO (Infrastructure Maintenance & 
Operation) and TAC (Track Access Charge). Systems 
contract between the government and Indonesian 
Railways (PT. KAI) is a one-year contract system. It 
was proposed by PT. KAI regarding the value of the 
PSO, IMO and TAC. The proposal is then reviewed 
by the government through the ministry of 
transportation. Once approved, the government made 
a formal contract with payment schemes 3 months 
after the implementation of the report by PT. KAI. 
(Muthohar, et al., 2010). 
4 METHODOLOGY 
The case study took place in Java Indonesia that 
based on secondary data. The secondary data has 
carried out from lecture modules, previous research, 
journal, books and trustworthy website. Informal 
interviews and discussions were done with personnel 
from Directorate General of Railway Indonesia. It 
took to formulate the problem with exploring the 
current condition of track maintenance management 
in Indonesia from the government point of view as an 
owner. 
The analysis is done by using comparison method 
which compares the British railway management and 
Indonesia railway management related to track 
maintenance management. It is conducting a study to 
track maintenance management system by Network 
Rail. The results were compared with track 
maintenance management system in Indonesia. The 
comparison will provide the data differences that 
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evaluated so the problem can be identified. The final 
result of this analysis is the identification of problems 
and improvisation that can be done for the 
development of track maintenance management in 
Indonesia. 
5 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
The general characteristics differences of Indonesia 
and British related with railway are shown in Table 1 
and Table 2 that describe main differences of British 
and Indonesia railways. 
Table 1.The general characteristics differences of railway 
between Indonesia and British 

















Train speed (average) 40-125 MPh  40-80 km/hour 
Track length (total km) 30,000 3,862 
Gauge 1463 1067 
Amount of track 
Single to double-
double track 
Single to double 
track 
Type of ballast track 



















9 DAOP and 3 
Divre 
5.1 Analyses and Identification Problem of Finance 
Management 
In the interest of track maintenance on the railway 
system, the British government built three 
departments; there is the Department for Transport 
(DfT), Network Rail (NR), and the Office of Rail 
Regulation (ORR). The financing infrastructure 
management is managed by Network Rail with 
access charge as primary sources. However, the 
financing construction of new lines or new 
technology derived from the system of government 
grants.  
NR is a non-profit organization that is responsible for 
DFT, while the ORR is an independent organization 
that is directly responsible to the head of government 
(ORR, 2014). ORR implements controller functions 
on train operators and infrastructure operator in both 
sectors: private (such as the TOCs and FOCs) and the 
state (such as NR) as illustrated by the red line. The 
green lines illustrated the flow of finance where the 
primary maintenance track funding comes from the 
access charge. The deviation between access charge 
(income) and the cost of maintenance and operation 
plus penalties (expenditure) could be the first 
indication of the performance assessment NR. Minus 
deviation identified not good performance indicator 
that gives warning to find the real problem. While 
other indicator identifies that Network Rail 
performance is still acceptable. 
Table 2.The differences organizer of railway between 
Indonesia and British 
Identification Indonesia Railway 
British 
Railway 
Regulator MoT ORR 
Regulation supervisor MoT ORR 
Finance (business plan) 
supervisor 
MSOE ORR 
Contract system 1 year 
5 year 
(minimum) 
Maintenance funding MoT NR 
Infrastructure owner MoT NR 
Infrastructure operator 
MoT but handed 






MoT but handed 




Track testing and 
assessment 




Maintenance inspection PT. KAI NR 
Renewal MoT NR 
 
Meanwhile, based on legal regulation (Presidential 
Regulation Number 53 Year 2012), Indonesian 
government empower the MoT as the owner of the 
infrastructure to operate and perform maintenance on 
it. Currently, the operation and maintenance of 
infrastructure provided to PT. KAI with the annual 
contract. The infrastructure financing (referred to 
IMO) provided by the government. The payment of 
IMO will be reduced by Access Charge (TAC). The 
deviation between TAC (income) and The IMO 
(expenditure) is an annual payment agreement and 
not based on the infrastructure performance at the 
time of operation, therefore, it cannot be used as an 
indication of infrastructure performance assessment 
and related organizations. 
PT. KAI is a profit organization which is responsible 
for financial management to MSOE and for safety 
and service to MoT. MoT is a government 
Vol. 3 No. 1 (January 2017) Journal of the Civil Engineering Forum 
54 
organization as an owner of railway infrastructure 
and as the controller implements function on train 
operators and infrastructure operator such as PT. 
KAI. 
According to (Muthohar, et al., 2010) suggest that the 
PSO, IMO and TAC are not as an independent entity 
but can only be an aggregate that calculates the net 
amount. This affects the performance of PT. KAI 
including declining in the maintenance track 
performance for each year as a frequent train 
derailment. 
In British Railway chart as shown in Figure 1, the 
circle shows how the mention of each transaction 
according to Indonesian Railway, to obtain the clear 
differences system in British and in Indonesia. The 
cross circle indicates that the Indonesian financing 
system does not use the system of franchise contract 
and penalties. While the other circle shows the 
similarities between the British and Indonesia system 
as follows: PSO≈ subsidy; cost ≈ IMO; and Access 
charge ≈ TAC. 
First problem is Franchise contract. In Indonesia 
Railways, there is only one operator companies (PT. 
KAI) for all route in Java and Sumatra, the 
government company that is profit-oriented. Thus, 
the State Company and monopoly system make no 
funding from the franchise system contract and the 
absence of competition provide superior properties to 
the company that will be difficult to establish a 
standard of fairness and impact on other financing 
primarily ticket pricing for consumers. 
 
 
Figure 1.The scheme of the BR and IR financing network 
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The second one is the time at contract system of 
IMO. A system is a one-year contract so the 
submission, reporting, and evaluation must be done 
every year. This condition will cause some problems, 
such as generalizations track conditions without 
considering location, geography, asset age, and etc; 
the deferred of maintenance financing due to 
submission and evaluation is still under discussion, 
and also there is no opportunity to take account plan 
to improve maintenance strategy. The last one is 
penalties systems and company characteristics. 
Penalties are given to the TOC from NR as a failure 
compensation infrastructure services (including 
track) which have resulted in a loss in the TOC so 
that each party sportive provides the best service. 
This is the problem of Indonesian railway so that it 
cannot be applied because of infrastructure 
maintenance and operations performed by the 
monopoly TOC (PT. KAI). 
NR as a non-profit company has a benchmark to 
provide the best performance to the user based on 
public service obligations by the State. Meanwhile, 
PT. KAI is a state-owned company in the form of 
profit-oriented that is giving a service with a 
maximum benefit to the company as its main 
benchmark. 
5.2 Analyses and identification problem of structure 
organization 
In the British Railway, the NR's internal policies will 
be affected directly or indirectly by some 
stakeholders: TOC / FOC, DFT, RSSB, and ORR. 
The relation between NR and TOC/FOC is based on 
business contract. TOC/FOC must pay NR for 
leasing infrastructure. Therefore, NR should provide 
infrastructure services according to the term of the 
contract with fines imposed for NR in case of failure 
infrastructure that causing losses to the TOC/FOC. 
DFT is a ministerial government that provides grants 
to NR. But, the accountability and assessment of the 
granted usage held by ORR is a government 
representative. So, there is not a direct relation 
between NR and DFT from policy or regulation point 
of view. 
RSSB is an independent non-profit company limited 
by guarantee (non-governmental organization) 
consisting of British railway stakeholders including 
NR. RSSB made up of many different organizations 
that determine the standards in the British Railway 
industry as the standard technical requirements of 
products or services to achieve efficiency financing, 
business performance improvement, and long-term 
development strategy. RSSB activities include 
understanding risk, railway standard setting, the 
management of research and innovation and 
improvement of cooperation in terms of sustainable 
improvement strategies. These standards will 
influence the internal policies NR to achieve a 
success performance management of track 
maintenance. It is also used by ORR to determine a 
benchmark for assessment. 
NR is directly regulated by the ORR for NR services 
performed on the railway, not only as an economic 
regulator but also as the safety regulator (replacing 
the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) since 2006). 
ORR duties are to ensure the railway availability: 
safe, high-performing and efficient. NR shall provide 
performance review and funding periodically to ORR 
and jointly establish further achievement in the 
relevant control period. 
In the Indonesia railway based on the regulation, the 
responsibility of maintenance, testing, and inspection 
is similar with the schematic of railway financing as 
shown in Figure 1. The Ministry of Transportation 
(MoT) by Directorate General of Railway (DGR) as a 
regulator and infrastructure owner has a duty to 
provide facilities for economy class public services as 
well as providing railway infrastructure and its 
maintenance (Directorate General of Railway, 2010). 
Based on the Three Joint Ministerial Decree, 
infrastructure maintenance and operation, it 
submitted to PT. KAI. The clear differences of 
organization between British and Indonesia Railway 
can be seen in Figure 2 (British Railway chart) with 
circle that shows the mention of each organization 
according to Indonesia railways. 
The cross circle indicates that the Indonesian system 
does not have particular train maintenance companies 
and train leasing companies. While the other circle 
shows the similarities of management responsibility 
between the British and Indonesia system as follows: 
DfT ≈ MoT; NR ≈ DGR (sub-department of MoT); 
TOCs & FOCs ≈ PT. KAI; and ORR ≈ DGR (sub 
department of MoT). 
In Figure 3 describes the separation of management 
responsibility in MoT and MSOE. Yellow circle is 
shown that the responsibility of management MOT 
represented in the sub-department DGR which is 
similar with management responsibilities by NR and 
ORR, while MSOE is similar with management 
responsibilities by DFT. 
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Figure 2.The scheme of the BR and IR structure organization network 
 
Figure 3.The scheme of infrastructure railway responsibility in Indonesia (MoT, 2011)
The Infrastructure is owned by the DGR 
(government) as well as operations and maintenance, 
which is also done by government funding through 
the State budget. The current maintenance and 
operational infrastructure however are handed over to 
PT. KAI (train operator) with a contract system. So, 
the ownership is nationalizing regimes while 
maintenance and operations are privatized regime. 
The nationalization management creates the state 
budget expense increase due to maintenance and 
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operations along with the additional construction of 
routes and track length. And, the privatization 
management creates submission the maintenance to 
the train operator, risk on the quality of maintenance 
performed. Maintenance is performed in accordance 
with the contract or minimizes the maintenance cost 
to get the maximum benefit. 
Indonesian railway regulations for safety and 
technical are held by DGR under the MoT, while 
regulations for finance are held by the Minister of 
State Owned Enterprises (MSOE). There is no-
independency for regulator to control the 
infrastructure: asset, operation and maintenance 
because the regulator and the owner in one 
department. And, there is no-integration between 
safety and economic regulators. Both of these 
regulations generally contradictory, so it is difficult 
to find an agreement, not even in a single department 
an agreement can be reached. In addition, there is no 
forum whose members stake holders (such as RSSB) 
to discuss technical standards, management 
standards, standard of service and standards of 
assessment as a fair basis of mutual agreement.  
5.3 Analyses and identification problem of asset 
management 
Using asset management strategy, NR has replaced 
and upgraded much of the infrastructure and 
significantly improved the safety and reliability of the 
railway over the last three years since submitted in 
October 2002. ORR regulatory, contractual 
requirements, company strategic business plan are 
processed by the asset management to be formulated 
into a policy and used as a benchmark to asset 
management strategies and objectives including track 
maintenance and renewal. 
According to the research results (Rais, 2008), the 
annual maintenance volume comparison based on the 
standard and PT. KAI data reflect the significant 
differences in the maintenance of rail, due to the 
corrective maintenance strategy and annual contract 
system. There is an accumulation of damage from 
previous years that repairs exceed the standard 
volume. Although, there is a standard maintenance, 
in fact, PT. KAI is only doing maintenance on the 
track with an index above 50 or poor predicated that 
is only corrective maintenance performed. 
Besides inspections carried out by PT. KAI with a 
value TQI, the government (General Railway) also 
conducts an inspection for measuring the track 
performance. Unfortunately, the inspection system of 
PT. KAI and DGR do not have a clear connection. 
Therefore the result of the data inspection is not used 
to optimal which then influences the decision maker 
of strategy maintenance. 
IR does not use the asset management system for 
track infrastructure so it is difficult to clearly define 
the business plan, assets policy, asset strategy 
including its maintenance, renewal, and others. 
Currently, the infrastructure planning refers to 
national master plans that concentrate on the 
development of new routes and capacity while 
development on an existing asset has not been taken 
into account such as a track maintenance that’s done 
only in keeping the track functional and is not 
impaired and kept safe. 
The problem of planning is still focused on the cost 
of construction and not counting the comparison 
between demand and cost of operation, inspection, 
maintenance, renewal, and others. 
IR uses a testing and inspection as a monitoring 
process, but currently, it is done only for new track 
and renewal. The surveys of punctuality and service 
performed by PT. KAI are the other way for 
monitoring and benchmarking success. But, the 
benchmark was in line with ticket prices increasing 
and restrictions on the number of passengers. The 
punctuality was based on the suitability of specified 
GAPEKA or reasonable delay without an increase. 
While the inspection is carried out by PT. KAI 
limited to the maintenance that needs to be done in 
certain areas. All of this show the control and 
assessment do not refer to the infrastructure 
reliability. 
Management of maintenance is performed by PT. 
KAI that arranged in contractual agreement. It 
limited in annual contract, therefore, it refers to the 
TBM and RBM strategies. The frequency of Time 
Based Maintenance (TBM) and renewal strategy are 
based on function of components’ age. Although, it 
has standard maintenance, but in fact, PT. KAI is 
only doing maintenance on the track with an index 
above 50 or poor predicated in which only Repair 
Based Maintenance strategy performed. 
Consequently, there are accumulations of damage 
from previous years that make repairs exceed the 
standard volume. 
PT. KAI and DGR perform inspection with different 
goals but both produce data that can be used in the 
planning phase. But unfortunately, the inspection 
system of PT. KAI and GR do not have a clear 
connection. Therefore the result of the data 
inspection is not used optimally which then influence 
the decision maker of strategy maintenance. 




Each issue has been described the advantages and 
disadvantages which are applied by British and 
Indonesian Railways as shown from Table 3 to Table 
6.  The advantages and disadvantages of each finance 
management problem that have been described, it can 
be formulated the improvement for Indonesia 
Railway finance management with eliminating the 
monopoly system by opening opportunities for other 
companies who want to join; restrictions monopolise 
authority through legislation and political policies; 
changing system maintenance contracts into the 
multi-years contracts with the evaluation system 
fixed per-year to ensure uninterrupted maintenance 
funding; the separation of infrastructure management 
including maintenance and operation from train 
operators; the best maintenance for infrastructure 
must be carried out by non-profit organization; but it 
needs a sound management with high financial 
guarantees. 




Problem 1: Franchise contract 
Multi-operator 
(TOC/FOC) 
(1) Big funding from track access 
(2) Fair competition 
(3) Best performance for  user 





(1) Less funding from track access 
(2) No- competition 
(3) No- choice for user 
Problem 2: The time at contract system of IMO 
Multi-years or by own 
(1) More detailed track conditions 
(2) No-deferred of maintenance financing 
(3) An opportunity to take account plan to 
improve maintenance strategy 
(4) Better infrastructure performance 
(5) Longer useful life of infrastructure 
component 
Huge cost at beginning 
One-year Low funding for every year 
(1) Generalizations track conditions 
(2) The deferred of maintenance financing due 
to assessment discussion 
(3) No opportunity to take account plan to 
improve maintenance strategy 
(4) Short useful life and huge cost for renewal 
(5) Low performance of infrastructure 




(1) Fair playing between infrastructure 
organizer and Train operator 
(2) Give the best performance 
Low performance will take more penalties and 
more subsidies 
Non-profit company 
The  benchmarking  is  the best performance for 
user 
Probably low incentive for workers 
Profitable company High incentive for workers 
The benchmarking is profit for company not for 
user 
Table 4. The advantages and disadvantages of each asset management problem 
Problem 9: Inspection connection (between inspection and operator & maintenance) 
Separately organiser Can compare the data 
(1) Self-interest = closed information 
(2) Unclear connection = the data 
cannot use optimally 
(3) Sometimes overlapping jobs 
United organiser 
(1) Open information 
(2) Clear connection = the data used optimal 
(3) More effective and efficient 
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Table 5.The advantages and disadvantages of each structure organization system 
Structure Organization Differences Advantages Disadvantages 
Problem 4: The position of Infrastructure Owner, Operator, and Maintenance 
The ownership is Nationalization regime 
Control  by  government  (include 
ticket price for the user) 
Huge cost must pay from State Budget 
The operating and maintenance is 
privatization regime 
Huge  cost  paid  from  company 
(most from user) 
Profitable benchmarking give low 
performance for user especially 
maintenance 
Problem 5: Regulator Position 
Independent between regulator and 
owner 
Fair regulation and supervise 
New department   means additional 
funding/cost and additional experts 
No independence correlation between 
regulator and owner 
No additional cost Unfair regulation or unfair 
Integration between  safety and 
economic regulators 
Give one benchmarking and give the 
best strategy for both 
Sometimes it  needs  hard and long 
discussion  to decide the priority 
No integration between safety and 
economic regulators 
Give the best benchmarking from both 
Both regulations generally 
contradictory 
Railway Standard board 
Have standard with a fair basis of 
mutual agreement 
Additional cost or funding for this 
organization 
Table 6.The advantages and disadvantages of each asset management system 
Asset Management Differences Advantages Disadvantages 
Problem 6: Asset financing plan (business plan) 
Asset financing plan (business 
plan) 
(1) Counting the benefit and lost from design 
until maintenance and renewal 
(2) Counting the cost and the funding with 
trend of demand 
It needs funding for developing asset 
management with software to control 
infrastructure and collect data. 
Problem 7: The system of monitoring and assessing on infrastructure (track) management 
Certification  benchmarking  by 
MoT 
Good Worthiness benchmarking for 
infrastructure operating readiness. 
With manual and limited certified 
person, it cannot periodic done for all 
line especially for existing line 
Report from ORR 
The random inspection sample to prove NR 
report, more simple and can do for limited 
person or time 
Sometimes random sample. Cannot give 
real condition (depend on the quantity 
of sample) 
Penalties benchmarking for NR Reliable  benchmarking 
Cannot do for privatization regime 
(infrastructure operator and 
maintenance unite with TOC) 
Benchmarking by PT KAI, 
(punctuality based on - 
GAPEKA, derailment event) 
- 
Unclear benchmark (it is not clear 
connection for infrastructure 
assessment) 
Problem 8: Maintenance management and strategy 
CBM (Condition Based 
Maintenance) 
No failure occur 
Need more inspection data  = need more 
cost 
TBM (Time Based 
Maintenance) 
Predictive failure based on component age 
Sometimes the failure occurs before 
predictive time because of other causes 
example overload or over speed. 
FBM (Failure/correction Based 
Maintenance) 
Less inspection data = less cost Accident often occur 
Multi-years maintenance 
contract / by owner 
(1) More detailed track conditions 
(2) Prevention of damage accumulation 
(3) better infrastructure performance 
(4) longer useful life of track component 
Huge cost at beginning 
Annual maintenance contract Low maintenance funding for  every year 
(1) Generalizations track conditions 
(2) Accumulation of damage 
(3) Short useful life of track component 
(4) Low performance of infrastructure 
   




British Railways have a fairly complete history of 
management, started from private regime to 
nationalization and then changed again to 
privatization and currently is the success story of 
public-private cooperation management. So, it is 
feasible as a standard reference for Indonesia 
Railway to analyze the problem and find out the 
improvement. 
Several management issues have been mapped to 
finance management, structure organization, and 
asset management. The finance management issues 
described as system monopoly by PT KAI and one-
year contract systems. 
The structure organization issues described as the 
position of owner, operator, and maintainer that is 
implicating of failure regime of BR history that 
dependency and no-integrity for regulator and 
supervisor. The asset management issues described 
no business plan to set up for the future cost, 
uncontrolled and non-assessment then refer to the 
infrastructure reliability, using TBM and RBM as a 
maintenance and management tool, and no 
integration of data collection because of unclear 
connection of inspection system between PT. KAI 
and DGR. 
From the problems that have been mapped above, 
some improvements are recommended with 
eliminating the monopoly system or restrictions 
monopolise authority, changing system maintenance 
contracts into the multi-years contracts with the 
evaluation system fixed per-year, separation and clear 
hierarchy for rail organization, delivering the 
infrastructure management to a non-profit company-
oriented, establishment of management and safety 
regulators and supervisor under single leadership to 
facilitate cooperation and integration, separation of 
the regulator into an independent organization, 
establishment of RSSB comprising stakeholders, the 
business plan consideration must be done, track 
monitoring with suitable strategy of inspection and 
assessment standard, reducing unnecessary cost by 
adoption of CBM strategy, adopting the maintenance 
management strategy by NR. 
Nevertheless, the improvements are highly dependent 
on huge capital, human resources capable and 
political decision which is the biggest obstacle in 
Indonesia Railways. 
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